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Abstract
The study focuses on analyzing conflicts between (international) investment
arbitration and the public interest, dividing its contents into five substantive
sections. First, it summarizes the common characteristics of international
investment arbitration (distinguishing procedural and substantive elements),
followed by its most pressing issues (including frequent criticism such as lack of
consistency, asymmetrical proceedings, regulatory chill, etc.). Afterwards, selected
investment arbitration cases are examined, grouped based on which areas of public
interest they affected (environmental protection, employee rights, public health).
These cases all hold relevance and offer different insights into the workings of
investment arbitration, which serve to illuminate the complex interplay between
foreign investor and public interest. The cases also provide the foundation for the
study’s conclusions, where key observations are made on the central subjects.
Keywords: BIT, ILA, ISDS, unclean hands, regulatory chill.
1. Introduction
International investment arbitration does not look back on a long history;
however, its prevalence is undeniable. We can identify several details that serve as
the source of this popularity, all of which contributed to the rise of investment
arbitration in their own way.
Firstly, we can point to the general economic developments in the post-World
War II era. With the exception of socialist countries, a general tendency towards
increased economic globalization slowly emerged. First in relation to trade, but
eventually, investors from wealthy countries began to look for opportunities to
invest their capital into developing countries, be that for the reason of untapped
natural resources, cheaper workforce or more lenient regulations. Thus, from the
foreign investors’ perspective, there was a drive towards using their capital
abroad, and foreign investments started to proliferate all over the globe.1
Secondly, again from the foreign investors’ perspective, was the general
atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding the governments of newly decolonized
developing countries and the unreliability of their domestic court systems in the
* Gábor Hajdu: PhD student, University of Szeged.
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1950s and 1960s. To the foreign investors, stability and legal reliability are both
paramount, so it is sensible that they would seek alternate means of ensuring
that their investments are safe and protected from nationalization, expropriation
or other discriminatory or restrictive governmental measures. While there was a
demand to export capital as explained in the above paragraph, this specific
circumstance seemed to be an obstacle.2
Furthermore, from the perspective of the host countries, it had become
increasingly clear that they could not rely on their own internal reserves of capital
to develop their economy. Thus, attracting foreign capital became an absolute
necessity for ensuring economic development, creating jobs, finding new
markets, and benefiting from technology transfer.3 This naturally incentivized
potential host countries to find a solution and provide adequate safeguards to
foreign investors.
Thus, we can conclude that there was a meeting of minds, or perhaps
interests between foreign investors (represented by their own governments) and
the host countries’ governments. These elements together paved the way for a
solution: the emergence of the investment arbitration system. With the rapid
expansion of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in the past half a century,
especially in the 1990s,4 this system gradually took shape and has become greatly
preferred by foreign investors.5 With additions such as the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), investment arbitration
seemingly secured its strong position as the investment dispute resolution
system.6
However, this position is continuously assailed by criticism. Especially in the
last ten years, criticism towards the investment arbitration system has been
mounting incessantly, citing various perceived problems and the apparent
conflict between public interest and foreign investors.7 Regardless, investment
arbitration has so far remained a staple of international agreements on the
treatment of foreign investors, with only one notable exception (CETA).8
In this article, we will first identify the unique characteristics of investment
arbitration and the key criticisms that are relevant to the subject at hand,
followed by a discourse on the interplay between public interest and investor
2 Vandevelde 2005, pp. 161-167.
3 Zoltán Víg, ‘The Importance of Foreign Direct Investments and Instruments for their
Protection’, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 59, Issue 4, 2018, p. 443.
4 Suzanne Kirayoglu, The Bilateral Investment Treaty: Its Origins and Effects, Florida State
University, 2014, p. 22.
5 Hasrat Arjjumend, ‘Regulatory Chill, Corporate Takeover and Environmental Governance’,
International Journal of Current Advanced Research, Vol. 6, Issue 12, 2017, p. 7924.
6 See e.g. Antonio R. Parra, The History of ICSID, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.
7 Caio Cesar Soares, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Analysis of the Reform Proposals on
Its Institutional Structure’, SSRN, 2017, pp. 2-3, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984581.
8 Shilpa Singh, ‘Analyzing Features of Investment Court System under CETA and EUVIPA:
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interest. This will be supported by the examination of several notable investment
arbitration cases. And finally, a conclusion will be drawn from all that was
discussed, aiming to determine a few key observations, and what the future will
hold for investment arbitration and its potential conflict with public interest.
2. Characteristics and Criticisms of Investment Arbitration
When identifying the unique characteristics of investment arbitration, it seems
prudent for us to establish two general categories: characteristics related to
procedural rules (such as the initiation of the dispute resolution, the formation
and constitution of the arbitration tribunal, etc.), and characteristics related to
the substantive law utilized by arbitral tribunals. While these two general
categories have connecting points with each other, and they are partially
entwined, examining them separately will allow us to present a clearer picture of
the overall system. The study will also present related criticisms alongside the
characteristics, as appropriate.
The first preliminary issue that should be established regarding procedural
rules is that there are several different possible arbitral frameworks that a given
investment dispute could use. This is determined by the treaty (or by the parties’
agreement) that provides the basis for the investment arbitration process in the
given case. Typically, BITs leave room for the parties to select a procedural
framework. However, the most widespread and popular rulesets are the ICSID
and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.9
The most important common procedural characteristic of the investment
arbitration system is, that unlike diplomatic methods of dispute resolution, the
two parties in the investment arbitration are always the foreign investor and the
host state. Although BITs are signed by states, the foreign investor’s state plays
only an indirect role in the arbitration proceedings, the foreign investor itself will
be the primary representative of its own interests. Furthermore, domestic
investors are naturally excluded from international investment arbitration due to
the lack of a foreign element. When determining the ‘nationality’ of a foreign
investor, investment arbitrators typically look for the ultimate controlling
interest, thus allowing domestic companies to participate as complainants,
provided they are subsidiaries of a foreign company or are otherwise under the
control of foreign investors.10
Not only is the nature of the parties involved always set, their exact position
in the dispute are also fixed. The complainant will always be the foreign investor,
while the respondent will always be the host state. This means that host states
have no ability to initiate disputes under the aegis of the investment arbitration
system. Their ability to present counterclaims is also significantly limited by most
BITs. Thus, the foreign investor will have almost exclusive control over whether
9 See at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention-Arbitration-Rules.as
px; see also at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/arbitration.
10 David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis of Treaty Practice’,
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2014/03, pp. 27-29.




the investment arbitration will be initiated at all, and what claims will be
presented before the arbitration tribunal.11
The one-sidedness of investment arbitration initiation is often considered
rather problematic, as it creates an inherent power balance discrepancy between
foreign investors and host states. This naturally occurs, because whenever there
is a dispute between the foreign investor and the host state, only the foreign
investor may turn to investment arbitration and initiate proceedings. Combined
with the limited ability to present counterclaims on the host state’s side, this
could easily be considered a great advantage to the foreign investor.12 Obviously,
foreign investors do have a certain advantage with regards to initiating
investment arbitration proceedings, but we also have to keep in mind that
investment arbitration itself is essentially a compensatory dispute resolution
mechanism, designed precisely to provide foreign investors with the option to
protect their investments when the host state’s domestic courts and processes are
potentially unreliable. It should not be forgotten that as sovereign entities, host
states already have the ability to enforce their will on the foreign investor (with
regards to their investments and other assets in the host state). Therefore, we
could easily argue that this one-sidedness does not really create a power
imbalance, but in fact alleviates an inherent power discrepancy between the
foreign investor and the host state due to their contrasting nature as a private
actor versus state entity.
A related issue that is sometimes raised as well is the fact that domestic
investors have no access to international investment arbitration. Given that
investments made by domestic and foreign investors might be competing with
each other, recourse to investment arbitration in case of a dispute with the given
government could be construed as an unfair advantage. If a given governmental
measure inflicts harm to both foreign-made and domestic-made investments,
only the foreign investor will be able to seek international investment arbitration
to redress their grievances. By contrast, the domestic investor will be at the mercy
of the domestic court system and legal processes in this situation.13 However, it is
worth noting that as presented earlier in the study, the very essence of
international investment arbitration rests in its nature as a solution to disputes
between foreign investors and host states. Domestic investors do not fit into the
overall concept of this system, and their inclusion would be unfounded, as BITs
and general free-trade agreements with investment chapters naturally focus on
granting these rights to each other’s investors, not to their own investors who
11 Soares 2017, p. 11.
12 Gus Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law’, in
Stephan Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 4.
13 See e.g. Ingolf Pernice, ‘Study on International Investment Protection Agreements and EU Law’,
in Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Policy Department (ed.), Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Provisions in the EU’s International Investment Agreements, p. 132; Gus
Van Harten, ‘Is It Time to Redesign or Terminate Investor-State Arbitration?’, Centre for
International Governance Innovation, 2017, at www.cigionline.org/articles/it-time-redesign-or-
terminate-investor-state-arbitration.
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can be handled through domestic legislation. In a similar fashion, justification for
investment arbitration rests on the notion that the host state’s domestic courts
and proceedings are inherently less amenable to foreign investors. Conversely,
this could be understood as meaning that they can be more favorable to domestic
investors than foreign ones, thus, the foreign investors’ access to investment
arbitration is compensated by the domestic investor having better access to
domestic methods of dispute resolution and being better able to pursue its rights
within the country, as opposed to the foreign investor. The domestic investor can
also, in theory, simply agree to a form of arbitration with its own state.
When it comes to the formation and constitution of the arbitration tribunals,
investment arbitration typically follows a rather classic method. While it depends
on the exact BIT and the procedural ruleset at play, there are usually three
arbitrators, two chosen by each of the parties, with the third being chosen by the
parties together. If they cannot reach common ground on that, the ICSID
Convention Arbitration Rules offer the option of having the Chairman of the
(ICSID) Administrative Council appoint the missing arbitrator at the written
request of either party.14 As for the arbitrators themselves, they are usually
renowned international legal experts, who operate in a for-profit format,
receiving financial compensation by the parties for their role in the arbitration
tribunals.
In general, the formation and constitution of arbitration tribunals encounter
less criticism, but it is notable that as mentioned beforehand, arbitrators operate
on a for-profit basis. Combined with the fact that only foreign investors can
initiate investment arbitration proceedings, it has led to the notion that
arbitrators might be more inclined towards foreign investors in their decisions.15
Furthermore, some critics have posited that the perceived institutional bias of
arbitrators is concerning enough in itself.16 However, this general line of thought
can be countered by two arguments. First, statistics do not support the assertion
that investment arbitrators are more favorable to investors, as this would mean
that the majority of the cases are won by the foreign investors, which is not
factual.17 Second, while the existence of a given tribunal is dependent solely on
the foreign investor, in its constitution the host state has equal say.
Another potential line of criticism is geared towards the duties of assistants
working with the arbitrators, especially with regards to how far they can go in
their duties when it comes to assembling the arbitration tribunal’s reasoning. The
14 2006 ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, Chapter 1, Rule 4.
15 Cecilia Olivet & Pia Eberhardt, ‘Profiting From Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and
Financiers Are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom’, Transnational Institute, 2012, at
www.tni.org/en/briefing/profiting-injustice.
16 See e.g. Gus Van Harten, ‘Fairness and Independence in Investment Arbitration: A Critique of
Susan Franck’s “Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration”’, SSRN, 2011, at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1740031.
17 See e.g. Howard Mann, ‘ISDS: Who Wins More, Investors or States?’, Investment Treaty News,
2015, at www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/itn-breaking-news-june-2015-isds-
who-wins-more-investors-or-state.pdf.




famous Yukos case is a good example for this dilemma, where such an assistant’s
participation in writing the award was the subject of dispute.18
The final procedural characteristic that should be noted is that the ‘loser pays’
principle is not applicable in investment arbitration. This is a near-universal
principle of this dispute resolution system, regardless of the BIT or procedural
framework that serve as the proceedings’ backdrop. Each party must
independently bear their legal expenses. The expenses incurred by the arbitrators
and their staff are similarly divided between the parties. Furthermore, the
tribunal may only assign an award to the foreign investor, so the host state
always faces a net financial deficit regardless of the proceedings’ ultimate
outcome.19
The cost of proceedings is thus a major criticism of the system. Legal fees
associated with investment arbitration are steep, as both sides have to finance
specialized teams of international lawyers and also compensate the arbitrators
and their staff. And due to the lack of the ‘loser pays’ principle, even if the host
state emerges as the ultimate winner, they still technically end up with a net loss
financially due to the cost of the proceedings as previously noted. Furthermore,
investment arbitration awards for the benefit of foreign investors can also pose a
significant financial problem, especially if the host state in question is a
developing nation.20
We can also establish some common characteristics regarding the substantive
aspects of investment arbitration. In a similar fashion to the procedural
characteristics, we must first mention that the primary (and near-exclusive) legal
basis for investment arbitration and its rulings are the BITs and more recently,
the investment chapters of free-trade agreements.21 Arbitration tribunals do not
interpret domestic law on their own, only to the extent whether said piece of
legislation is legitimate considering the provisions of the given BIT or FTA.22
Despite the large number of these BITs, most have similar substantive
provisions.23 First of these are the definitions. BITs always contain a number of
definitions ranging from common terms such as investor, investment, and so on.
For investment arbitration tribunals, it is very often necessary to interpret these
definitions. The bases for such interpretations vary greatly, however. Compared
to say domestic legislation, BITs lack a definite reading supplied by the domestic
18 Dmytro Galagan, ‘The Challenge of the Yukos Award: An Award Written by Someone Else – A
Violation of the Tribunal’s Mandate?’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 2015, at http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/02/27/the-challenge-of-the-yukos-award-an-
award-written-by-someone-else-a-violation-of-the-tribunals-mandate/.
19 See e.g. Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, ‘Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty
Arbitration Revisited’, Global Arbitration Review, 2017, at www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/
news-and-insights/news/damages-and-costs-in-investment-treaty-arbitration-revisited.
20 Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, ‘The Outsized Costs of Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, Academy
of International Business Insights, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2016, p. 11.
21 Vandevelde 2005, pp. 184-193.
22 Lise Johnson et al., ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law’,
CCSI Policy Paper, 2015, p. 2, at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-
Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf.
23 Kirayoglu 2014, p. 25.
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court system, the local legal culture or precedents. As such, these definitions
often have to be interpreted on their own, though arbitrators might draw from
previous similar investment cases or international legal literature on the subject.
Regardless, this is not mandatory for them.24
Standards of treatment can be considered another critical characteristic of
substantive rules when we are discussing investment arbitration. These typically
range from familiar phrases such as national treatment and most-favored nation
(MFN) treatment to the ubiquitous ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET)
standard.25 In a similar fashion to definitions, investment arbitration tribunals
are free to interpret these standards and their applicability to the given dispute.
There is no uniform interpretation of these standards, and hence arbitrators are
free to rely on their own judgment and may use any particular source for
rendering their decisions.26
As for the key criticisms related to the substantive elements of investment
arbitration, it all comes down to the issue that there is no authoritative body to
provide a uniform legal interpretation of these treaties, and that precedents do
not have to be followed. As noted beforehand, investment arbitrators decide
cases based on their own readings of the given definitions and standards of
treatment within the treaties. This could be interpreted as posing the issue of
legal uncertainty regarding the outcome of the cases, as the parties may never be
exactly sure how the arbitration tribunal would interpret a given passage of the
BIT or other treaties.27
3. The Issue of Public Interest
All of the previous criticisms of the investment arbitral system lead to our main
subject at hand: public interest. Within the context of international investment
law, a public interest regulation is any kind of regulation that has a basis different
than a state of necessity, public order or national security.28 This naturally means
that they cover a wide range of subjects, though their importance is not
diminished by this diversity. In particular, fields such as labor law, environmental
law and public health regulation can all be considered to be of great relevance to a
given state’s legislative function.
However, the interests of foreign investors are very frequently at odds with
the public interest of the given host state. From the foreign investor’s
perspective, what is beneficial is a lax system of regulations that allows them to
maximize the profits of their investments. However, the public interest often
demands stricter regulation. This is especially the case in the aforementioned
24 Soares 2017, pp. 24-27.
25 See e.g. UNCTAD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements II, 2012.
26 Soares 2017, pp. 24-27.
27 Id.
28 Alison Giest, ‘Interpreting Public Interest Provisions in International Investment Treaties’,
Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, p. 334.




fields, such as labor law or environmental law. E.g. foreign investors want the
lowest possible minimum wage in order to increase their returns on their
investment.29 In a similar fashion, environmental regulation is usually harmful to
the foreign investors, forcing them to reduce their profit in order to comply with
the regulations. Health regulations can also lead to a loss of profit. Because of
these reasons, most BITs and other investment-related treaties contain
provisions that affirm the right of the host states to legislate in pursuit of
legitimate public interest.30 This appears to be an easy solution to this apparent
conflict.
However, in reality, the issue is not so simple. First, we have to consider that
these provisions are often vaguely defined, giving significant leeway to
investment arbitrators when it comes to interpreting them. Especially terms such
as ‘legitimate’ could pose a challenge. This is compounded by the burden of proof:
from the foreign investor’s side, it is often only necessary to prove that damages
were incurred and that these damages were in direct connection with or the result
of a government measure. Thus, it is frequently the host state’s obligation to
prove that said measure fell within legitimate public interest, and that no
provision was violated.31
Secondly, there might be an internal conflict of interest within the host state
itself. While there could be a sort of public interest that the state intends to
pursue, such as environmental or social goals, it is also true that they can have an
economic and a budgetary interest as well. Introducing measures that ‘ruffle the
feathers’ of foreign investors could lead to the pulling out of the said investors
and perhaps even others from the given host state. And as it was noted in the
introduction, the host states are often reliant on foreign capital for economic
development. Hence, deciding to pursue a public interest-based policy could easily
lead to an economic downturn, which might not be something the host state’s
government is willing to risk. There is also a more direct concern regarding the
costs of investment arbitration, particularly when the foreign investor ends up
winning the case and is awarded damages. These sums could easily end up
amounting to a significant percentage of the host state’s budget, especially when
it comes to a developing country with a weaker economy and financial reserves.32
Not respecting the ruling carries its own set of dire consequences, and could
easily lead to capital flight and cause a recession due to shortage of foreign
capital.33
29 E.g. Veolia Propreté v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15, at https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/458/veolia-v-egypt.
30 See e.g. Vera Kozun, ‘The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and Dicing
Regulatory Carve-Outs’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 50, Issue 2, 2017, pp.
355-414.
31 Angelos Dimopoulos, ‘Climate Change and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Identifying the
Linkages’, in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed.), Research Handbook on Climate Change and Trade Law,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016, p. 430.
32 Hodgson & Campbell 2017.
33 Ashley Schram et al., ‘Internalisation of International Investment Agreements in Public
Policymaking: Developing a Conceptual Framework of Regulatory Chill’, Global Policy, Vol. 9,
Issue 2, 2018, p. 3.
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Under such circumstances and given the above issues related to investment
arbitration, it may be economically advantageous for the host state’s government
to simply not implement their own measures and let foreign investors have their
way, rather than risk a protracted investment arbitration proceeding. In general,
we call this phenomenon regulatory chill. Its existence is controversial and
difficult to prove (as insight into the minds of legislators and executives is rare
and hard to obtain). Furthermore, different scholars posited different types of
regulatory chill.34 The concept could be categorized in a number of different ways,
such as anticipatory chill, which is the version we described above, or direct chill
where there is a concrete threat of investment arbitration from foreign investors.
Some have also posited the existence of a precedential or cross-border chill, where
concluded (or even ongoing) investment arbitration cases affecting a nearby
state, could influence a given host-state in its decision-making, in case it is also
considering similar measures.35
Thus, the next logical step is to examine a few relevant cases of investment
arbitration, where we can observe the discussed clash between public and
investor interests. These will be organized into three categories based on the
public interest element: instances where investor interest clashed with
environmental protection, instances where investor interest clashed with
employee rights, and instances where investor interest clashed with public health
concerns. Using these examples, it will be possible to make a few observations,
and draw a conclusion from these regarding the future.
4. Foreign Investors Versus Environmental Protection
In this particular section, three cases won by foreign investors will be presented,
each aimed at showing how environment-related public interest can be trumped
by foreign investor interest, and how having ‘unclean hands’ is often not an
obstacle for foreign investors in getting their way.
Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador36 stands out as an infamous investment
arbitration case with one of the largest investor awards in the history of the
system. This particular dispute concerned the US-based oil corporation known as
the Occidental Petroleum Corporation and the government of Ecuador. Their
dispute was based around the termination of a certain oil license in the Amazon
region, originally granted to the corporation by the Ecuadorian government. This
license was embodied by a contract between the corporation and the government.
The contract mandated that the sale of production rights without pre-approval by
34 See e.g. Satwik Shekhar,’’Regulatory Chill’: Taking Right to Regulate for a Spin’, Centre for WTO
Studies, WP/200/27, 2016; Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A
View from Political Science’, in Chester Brown & Kate Miles (eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty
Law and Arbitration, 2011.
35 Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill in a Warming World: The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by
Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, Transnational Environmental Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2018, pp.
229-250.
36 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, at www.italaw.com/cases/767.




the Ecuadorian government would constitute a breach of the contract, as
Ecuador’s hydrocarbons law provisioned the thorough appraisal of companies
seeking to extract resources in the environmentally fragile Amazonas area. Said
law was also explicitly integrated into the contract.
However, in 2006, the corporation decided to sell off 40% of its production
rights without first requesting the approval of the Ecuadorian government, which
led to Ecuador claiming a breach of the contract (as well as a violation of the
above-mentioned law) and ultimately, the termination of the entire oil license. In
turn, the corporation initiated investment arbitration against Ecuador, based on
the Ecuador-US BIT. In particular, it claimed that Ecuador’s contract terms and
the law in question violated the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard.
Interestingly, the tribunal in this particular case used a proportionality
argument: it stated that while the corporation did indeed act unlawfully and the
government’s response was justified, it still noted that the ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ standard demanded an implicit degree of proportionality and that
Ecuador’s actions were not proportionate to the breach of contract the US
corporation committed. As such, the tribunal found Ecuador to be in the wrong,
and awarded nearly 1.8 billion USD to Occidental. This enormous sum was
calculated based on the future profits of the corporation if it had the chance to
exploit fully the oil reserves contained within the license. More bizarrely, the
tribunal chose to disregard that Occidental attempted to sell 40% of its
production rights, and instead used the full license as the basis of the calculation.
In a very small victory for the host state, it did determine that the corporation
was responsible for 25% of its projected losses due to the aforementioned breach
of contract, but for the rest, Ecuador was liable.
Ecuador later attempted to annul the award, which only partially succeeded
in 2015. The annulment committee did decide that the above noted 40% of the
production rights should be excluded from the calculation of damages, and thus
reduced the award to 1 billion USD.
Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador is a strong example of the seemingly
outlandish interpretations investment tribunals can sometimes use. The ‘fair and
equitable treatment’ standard did not necessarily mandate a degree of
proportionality, yet the tribunal chose to interpret it in such a way. Furthermore,
this case highlights a certain tendency in investment arbitration cases to (at least
partially) disregard the ‘unclean hands’ of foreign investors (that is to say, the
foreign investor acting in bad faith or even operating in a criminal manner in the
host state), even if the host state was pursuing a legitimate public interest with
its measures. This tendency will also be reflected by the following Copper Mesa
case.
Copper Mesa v. Ecuador was another case that affected Ecuador as the host
state.37 This particular dispute also concerned a resource license, this time a
mining license. The background of the case goes back to the late 1990s when large
ore deposits of copper were discovered in the Ecuadorian Northwest. The related
37 Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, at www.italaw.com/cases/
4206.
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license was initially granted to a national, but it was later sold to a Canadian
mining company (through its subsidiaries). Afterwards, the foreign investor
began developing the area. This was met by organized resistance from the local
communities, who were concerned about the environmental effects of Copper
Mesa’s mining activities. According to allegations by Ecuador, Copper Mesa
responded in a rather heavy-handed and legally questionable manner to these
protests. In the end, it was this conflict with the locals that prompted Ecuador to
terminate the license through a new legislation called the Mining Mandate
(2008), which allowed the expropriation of certain mining licenses without
economic compensation. This ultimately occurred to Copper Mesa’s licenses as
well.
Whereupon, Copper Mesa initiated investment arbitration under the Canada-
Ecuador FIPA. Regarding jurisdiction, there was a dispute between the parties
about whether Copper Mesa is allowed to advance damage claims for damages
that were directly suffered by its subsidiaries, who therefore must each consent to
arbitration separately. The tribunal sided with the company on the matter,
arguing that Copper Mesa was only advancing a claim for the damages that it
itself suffered as an investor. The second interesting element is related to the
issue of ‘unclean hands.’ Ecuador tried to argue, based on a considerable body of
evidence, that due to the illegal actions of Copper Mesa, there should be no
jurisdiction, heavily relying on international legal doctrines in the process. This
was rebuffed by the tribunal as a question of admissibility, not jurisdiction, and
that Ecuador failed to raise these international legal points before the
arbitration’s commencement. Thirdly, the tribunal concluded that Ecuador acted
in an arbitrary manner and neglected due process. Finally, while the tribunal
ultimately found in favor of Copper Mesa, it did end up noting that the
corporation contributed 30% of its loss through contributory negligence, ending
in an approximately 20 million USD award in total (and compound interest).
This case is a particularly extreme example of the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine
being ignored by arbitration tribunals. Furthermore, despite the circumstances
presented in the case, the tribunal did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the
Ecuadorian public interest, as the government was ultimately acting on the
request of local communities adversely affected by the mining activities of Copper
Mesa. Perhaps it is partially for this reason that the enforcement of the award is
still pending, as Ecuador managed to successfully delay its payments.38
Another relevant case related to foreign investor interests clashing with
environmental protection, though of less financial significance compared to
Occidental Petroleum, is Abengoa v. Mexico.39 This case is particularly notable for
the fact that unlike in the previous two examples, the central, or rather federal,
government, was supportive of the foreign investor in its activities, with the
source of conflict arising solely from the side of municipality. In this particular
38 ‘Defunct Canadian Miner Says Ecuador Avoiding $24M Award’, Law360, 2017, at
www.law360.com/articles/898360/defunct-canadian-miner-says-ecuador-avoiding-24m-award.
39 Abengoa S.A. y COFIDES S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2, at
www.italaw.com/cases/1871.




case, a Spanish corporation planned to construct a waste management plant. Not
long after the construction began, the corporation’s efforts to construct the plant
met with local opposition, which included the creation of a new civil association
called ‘Unidos por Zimapán’ that mounted a campaign against the plant’s
construction for environmental reasons. Another group was later formed by the
civil association, specifically aimed at impeding the plant’s installation. The local
authorities eventually started siding with protesters, and refused to renew the
company’s construction license at the end of 2007. Regardless, the foreign
investor continued to construct the plant, and even used the Mexican federal
police to protect its interests against the civilian protest groups as violence
escalated, which led to the company’s operating license being completely revoked
by 2010. This decision by the municipality was opposed by federal authorities.
After the plant’s completion, the municipal authorities refused to allow the
plant’s operation, citing that its license was invalid, and the above-mentioned
public interest concerns still stood. This led to the foreign investor initiating
arbitration against Mexico under the Spain-Mexico BIT.
The arbitration tribunal ultimately found in favor of the Spanish investor,
noting that the municipality’s actions in denying and impeding licenses for the
waste plant amounted to indirect expropriation and violated the ‘minimum
standard of treatment’ principle. As a consequence, it awarded more than 40
million USD to the foreign investor in damages.
While the above three were only a selection of the most infamous cases
related to environmental interests, they still sufficiently display the potential
consequences of investment arbitration. Arbitration tribunals can have different
priorities and views compared to public interests in host states. It is often the
case that, even though a black letter reading of investment treaty provisions may
lead to certain outcomes, doing so also ends up harming potentially legitimate
public interest, especially when it comes to environmental concerns. And as
investment treaties are often vaguely worded and offer significant room for
interpretation (as we have seen e.g. in how the tribunal in Occidental Petroleum
expanded ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to contain reciprocity, or how the notion
of the foreign investors breaking domestic laws and pursuing illegal courses of
action was so easily dismissed as irrelevant by the tribunal in Copper Mesa),
strange and unexpected outcomes can easily come about.
5. Foreign Investors Versus Employee Rights
While there are other investment arbitration cases related to labor law, Veolia v.
Egypt40 is the most relevant from the study’s perspective, as it serves to
demonstrate investment arbitration’s potential for seemingly frivolous investor
claims that are accompanied by costly proceedings. Unlike the other cases
included in this study, Veolia was not made public, but secondary sources are
40 Veolia Propreté v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15, at https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/458/veolia-v-egypt.
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available to supplement the official information, which can be used to examine
the key details of the case.41
The basis for the dispute lies in a contract between the Alexandrian municipal
government and Veolia, a French corporation. This contract centered around
Veolia providing waste management services in Alexandria over a fifteen-year
period. However, when Egypt revised some of its labor laws, leading notably to an
increase in minimum wage, the foreign investor initiated investment arbitration
proceedings against the country, claiming that they suffered a loss in relation to
their investment. The basis of these proceedings was the France-Egypt BIT.
Based on the information available, the proceedings lasted for six years in
total (three years spent on jurisdictional matters and three years on the merits of
the case), and ultimately ended with Egypt’s victory and the investor’s claims
being rejected. However, it can be argued that this was not a true victory for the
country, as it still had to endure six years of arbitration and the associated legal
and arbitrator fees. This is especially egregious when considering the nature of
the dispute, and that something that is usually taken as the sovereign right of
every state (raising the minimum wage) would be considered grounds for
investment arbitration. Of course, one can raise the obvious counter-argument
that if there was a guarantee of a certain degree of profit in the original contract,
or if the contract ensured that certain legitimate expectations were to be met,
then there was a responsibility for Egypt to respect that. Obviously, this issue is
further muddled by the fact that the contract was concluded by a municipal
government, which had no control over the actions of the Egyptian national
government and legislature. In conclusion, this case highlights the difficulty in
determining where legitimate investor expectations end, and where common-
sense state sovereignty begins.
The second case to be discussed here is AbitibiBowater v. Canada.42 This
particular case occurred between a US investor and Canada. The basis was that
the US corporation owned several timber mills and hydroelectric plants within a
province of Canada. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the corporation began
closing these mills, causing many of its employees to lose their jobs. In response,
the provincial legislature ended the corporation’s local forestry and water rights,
and expropriated its related, still extant, assets. Compensation was determined to
be subject at the discretion of the provincial government itself. These decisions
were allegedly made so as to mitigate the consequences of the corporation’s
restructuring and preserve the jobs still available in the province.
As a direct consequence of the legislature’s decision, the corporation initiated
investment arbitration against Canada, based on Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, under
UNCITRAL rules, seeking 500 million Canadian dollars in damages. However, this
case notably closed before it could begin, as AbitibiBowater successfully




42 AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/10/1, at www.italaw.com/
cases/39.




negotiated a settlement with the Canadian government, leading to a 130 million
Canadian dollars payout to the foreign investor.
With regards to this particular case, it could be argued that the foreign
investor was merely acting to preserve its own finances, hence the closures of its
facilities in the province. On the other hand, there was also a legitimate public
interest on the side of the provincial government, in seeking to preserve the
continued operation of these facilities, that were likely vitally important to the
continued wellbeing of local communities (through providing employment). And
while the case never went to arbitration, the foreign investor still triumphed and
the host state still lost in a sense, as 130 million Canadian dollars were paid to the
investor as part of the settlement. Furthermore, it must be noted that this
occurred against the backdrop of an economic crisis and the recovery period after
it. Under such circumstances, both foreign investors and host states may jump to
taking rash actions and measures, but only host states (and their taxpayers) will
be ‘punished’ later for these.
6. Foreign Investors Versus Public Health
The first case to be discussed here is similar to the previous Canadian case in
some respects but is at the same time a much older case. This, however, does not
diminish its continued relevance and importance, and as such, serves as an
excellent example of what long-term effects investment arbitration can cause.
Ethyl v. Canada43 concerned a dispute between a US chemical company and
Canada, and was based on MMT, a certain gasoline additive that was often used
to improve the performance of engines. Canada decided to ban the substance for
intra-provincial transport and importation in 1997, arguing that the additive had
grave implications to public health due to its toxic components. This led the US
corporation to initiate investment arbitration against the host state under the
NAFTA, claiming that this ban constituted an indirect expropriation.
Much like the later AbitibiBowater case, this case ultimately did not reach an
award. It went a bit further, however, as the tribunal did manage to determine its
own jurisdiction, but shortly afterwards in 1998, Canada agreed to settle with the
foreign investor. It agreed to pay the corporation compensation for its damages
(USD 13 million) and also pay for its fees. But even more importantly, it agreed to
accept MMT as a safe substance and reverse its ban.
The relevance of this case is that it served as an enduring potential example
of regulatory chill, in the form of direct chill in particular. While the foreign
investor did not succeed in threatening Canada into reversing its ban at first, it
did ultimately manage to accomplish this. And even more noteworthy is that not
only was the original ban reversed, Canada had to later rely on voluntary
restrictions by local industries to lessen the presence of MMT in gasoline.44 As
43 Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, at www.italaw.com/cases/409.
44 See e.g. Gloria Calloway, ‘Refineries Stop Using MMT Gasoline Additive’, The Globe and Mail,
2004, at www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/refineries-stop-using-mmt-gasoline-addit
ive/article1008715/.
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previously noted, this underscores the potential for investment arbitration to
shape governmental policy on a lengthy timescale.
The next two cases are to be examined in tandem, as they both concern the
same claimant: Philip Morris. Not too far apart in time, this foreign investor
attempted to sue two different countries for healthcare regulations concerning
tobacco. In the first, Philip Morris v. Australia,45 it attempted to use investment
arbitration to prevent Australia from implementing these aforementioned
measures, and also potentially to influence countries considering similar
measures at the time (e.g. New Zealand).46 However, the arbitration tribunal
ruled this attempt inadmissible, as the foreign investor used a quick corporate
restructuring, in order to be able to sue Australia under the Australia-Hong Kong
BIT. Nevertheless, Philip Morris managed to achieve its objective partially, as
New Zealand’s adoption of similar measures were delayed until Australia came
out as the victor of the investment dispute.47
The corporation had considerably more luck, at least on the short term, in the
second, Philip Morris v. Uruguay48 case, where it challenged Uruguay’s new tobacco
laws, aimed at mitigating endemic smoking among the population. Their suit was
based on the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. This arbitration went all the way to the
merits’ stage, and ultimately closed with Uruguay’s victory. Due to the favorable
readings given by the investment arbitrators in the case, this could be considered
a strong counterexample against the other cases presented supra. However, it
should be noted, that Uruguay had to rely on a charitable fund to finance its legal
fees,49 without which the case could likely have had a very different outcome.
Furthermore, favorable readings by one arbitration tribunal does not imply that
similar affirmations of the host state’s right to regulate would arrive from other
tribunals, who may choose to decide more in line with the other cases presented
here.
In general, these two cases represent an ongoing trend by foreign investors
attempting to use investment arbitration as a tool to affect states other than
their direct targets. At the moment, it seems their efficacy in this is partial and
limited at best, but it does not discount the possibility completely.
The final case to be discussed in the study is the protracted case known as
Renco v. Peru.50 These are actually two cases, one dismissed and one still pending.
The case revolved around the privatization of a smelter. When this privatization
45 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, at
www.italaw.com/cases/851.
46 Lukasz Gruszczynski, ‘Australian Plain Packaging Law, International Litigations and Regulatory
Chilling Effect’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2014, p. 245.
47 Id.
48 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, at www.italaw.com/cases/460.
49 Sabrina Tavernise, ‘Tobacco Firms’ Strategy Limits Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws’, New York
Times, 2013, at www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-industry-tactics-limit-poorer-
nations-smoking-laws.html.
50 The Renco Group, Inc. v. Republic of Peru [I], ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1, at www.italaw.com/
cases/906; The Renco Group, Inc. v. Republic of Peru [II], PCA Case No. 2019-46, at
www.italaw.com/cases/6179.




occurred in 1997, the US-based Renco’s subsidiary made a commitment to clean
up the toxic contamination caused by the metal smelting activities. Despite
several Peruvian extensions to the deadline, the corporation failed to fulfill this
commitment, leading to class action lawsuits against Renco’s Peruvian subsidiary
in Missouri (where the corporation was incorporated), demanding compensation
for the Peruvian locals whose health had been allegedly affected by the smelter.
As a consequence, in 2010, Renco initiated investment arbitration against Peru,
claiming that the host state violated the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ included in
the US-Peru FTA by not providing another deadline extension to the Peruvian
subsidiary, and that it should be assumed liable for the class action lawsuits
pending against it.
It took six years of investment arbitration for the tribunal to determine that
they have no jurisdiction over the case, because the FTA included a requirement
that the foreign investor must waive domestic litigation rights to advance an
investment arbitration claim, something that Renco failed to do. Nevertheless,
Peru incurred a significant financial cost in the course of the case, and it was a
short-lived victory: in just two years, Renco launched a new investment
arbitration proceeding against Peru, based on the same facts and claims. The
outcome of this case is still pending.
Renco v. Peru serves as an excellent example for the persistence of foreign
investors and the prolonged nature of many investment disputes. It is important
to note here, that from a technical perspective, the failure occurred on the foreign
investor’s end (failing to fulfill its contractual obligations), yet, it was able to drag
its host state into an extremely lengthy series of litigations that continue to this
day.
7. Conclusions
Based on the case-law presented in the preceding three sections, it is possible to
pinpoint a few important issues.
As shown by Occidental, Copper Mesa and other cases, ‘unclean hands’ is not a
reliable defense for host states in investment arbitration. The wrongdoings of
foreign investors have only a marginal effect on how efficiently they are able to
pursue their claims against the host states. Even if the foreign investor is
engaging in illegal activities (Copper Mesa) or failing to fulfill a direly important
obligation (Renco), the tribunal will not necessarily accept the response measures
of the host state. This creates the unfortunate perception of investment
arbitration (and foreign investors by extension) being ‘above’ domestic laws, and
reinforces a perceived unfairness and injustice from the public’s viewpoint.
Second, local and provincial governments seem to be particularly vulnerable
to investment arbitration. As shown in Abengoa, even their own central or federal
authorities may oppose them in the pursuit of the foreign investor’s interests.
This could lead to situations where the central government, so as to avoid a costly
investment arbitration, is incentivized to silence or neutralize local or provincial
governments themselves, even if they are acting out of legitimate public interest.
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Furthermore, we can also note that the line between public interest and
unacceptable expropriation seems rather thin and shaky. Whenever the threat of
investment arbitration rises, the host state can never be certain about its
outcome. Hence, there is likely an incentive to settle (Ethyl, AbitibiBowater),
which actually secures a degree of victory for the foreign investor. Furthermore,
even if the host state triumphs against a seemingly frivolous claim, they still
likely have to spend significant time and money protecting their decisions
(Veolia).
Finally, as shown by the two Philip Morris cases, there is the threat of a knock-
on effect. One investment arbitration case could potentially be used by foreign
investors to discourage other host states from considering similar measures. And
if these efforts are successful, the chilling effect can linger for a significant period
of time as shown by Ethyl, where the foreign investor’s effort to prevent MMT
from being banned affected Canada’s legislation for decades to come.
In conclusion, it is clear that the criticisms facing investment arbitration have
a basis in reality, to a certain degree. The above negative tendencies reduce public
faith in the system, and might eventually lead to a backlash. Good examples of
this are the anti-TTIP and anti-CETA protests, which partially focused on the fact
that both of these free-trade agreements would have included investment
arbitration. In CETA’s case, as it was noted early on the study, it actually led to an
alternate dispute settlement system being created.51
As for the future, we will likely see the debate continue unimpeded. It seems
probable that the current model is not very sustainable, at least with regards to
public perception, so reforms will likely occur in time. However, there are still
many supporters of the current investment arbitration model, including the
foreign investors, who would likely not favor radical change.
51 Singh 2019.
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